Is your biofuel affixed with an approved seal? : A comparative analysis of the European Union Biofuels Certification Regime and the Clean Development Mechanism by Lin, JSW
Title
Is your biofuel affixed with an approved seal? : A comparative
analysis of the European Union Biofuels Certification Regime
and the Clean Development Mechanism
Author(s) Lin, JSW
Citation Journal of Environmental Law, 2011
Issued Date 2011
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/137047
Rights Journal of Environmental Law © 2011. Published by OxfordUniversity Press. All rights reserved.
 1 
This is a PRE-PRINT version of an article that has been accepted for publication in the 
Journal of Environmental Law (2011), published by Oxford University Press. All rights 
reserved. 
 
Is your biofuel affixed with an approved seal?: A Comparative Analysis of the 
European Union Biofuels Certification Regime and the Clean Development 
Mechanism 
Jolene Lin∗ 
 
Abstract  
As a key actor behind the emerging global biofuels market, the European Union 
has introduced environmental regulations governing biofuels. This article analyses the 
biofuels ‘meta-standard’ certification scheme which creates a transnational 
governance regime involving a regional bloc, States, non-governmental organisations 
and businesses in a hybrid regulatory model combining elements of private 
certification and public authority. A comparison between the role of Designated 
Operational Entities in the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
and the certification schemes in the EU sustainability regulatory regime demonstrates 
that the problems that threaten the environmental integrity of the CDM are less likely 
to emerge in the EU biofuels context.  
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Introduction 
 
In the global quest for climate change mitigation solutions, biofuels have been 
celebrated for their potential to reduce the carbon footprint of transportation. As a 
fossil fuel substitute that is derived from agricultural products such as corn and sugar 
cane, biofuels also respond to energy security concerns and rural development policy 
agendas.1 Perceived as a ‘triple-win’ solution that can help lower greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions, enhance energy security and boost rural development, many 
governments have introduced domestic incentive programmes to boost biofuel 
production and use.2 At the same time, a global biofuels system has begun to emerge, 
featuring global trade, global investments and global standards.3  
 
                                                 
1
 See discussion in James Smith, Biofuels and the Globalization of Risk: The biggest change in 
North-South relationships since colonialism? (London: Zed Books, 2010) at pages 5-7 where the 
author suggests (at page 6) that “Biofuels fire the imagination of policy-makers, entrepreneurs, 
researchers and governments because of the possibility of being all things to all people.”  
2
 OECD, Trade and Agriculture Directorate, Committee for Agriculture, Working Party on 
Agricultural Policies and Markets, “A Review of Policy Measures Supporting Production and Use of 
Bioenergy”, Document Number: TAD/CA/APM/WP(2007)24/FINAL (July 2008), available online: 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/37/43/41037609.pdf (accessed on 23 March 2011).  
3
 Mol, Arthur P. J. (2010) Vol. 19(1) “Environmental authorities and biofuel controversies'”, 
Environmental Politics, 61- 7 at 63; see M. Kojima et al, “Considering Trade Policies for Liquid 
Biofuels”, World Bank, Renewable Energy Special Report 004/07, May 2007, available online: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTOGMC/Resources/Considering_trade_policies_for_liquid_biofu
els.pdf (accessed on 20 March 2011), for discussion on how liberalizing trade in liquid biofuels might 
affect biofuel production and consumption.  
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 There are, however, growing concerns about how increased biofuel production 
can assert upward pressure on food prices, increase GHG emissions, and exacerbate 
degradation of land, forest, and water sources. The production and consumption of 
biofuels is therefore one of the key environmental and sustainability concerns of the 
day and there is a widely perceived need for the environmental regulation of biofuels. 
As the development of a global biofuels trading system is at an early stage, the 
challenge for biofuels governance and regulation is to point developments in the 
direction of what Mol terms as ‘fair fuels’. Fair fuels are “fuels that fulfil social and 
environmental conditionalities throughout the production chain. Hence, fair fuels refer 
not to a particular source of energy but to the fulfilment of legitimate social and 
environmental criteria”.4 
 
If one considers that biofuels is a politically instituted market and will not exist if 
not for extensive policy intervention such as mandatory blending targets, the 
European Union (EU) is the main driver behind the creation of the global biofuels 
market through its climate change and renewable energy policies.5 It can be argued 
that the EU biofuels sustainability regulatory regime is a quest for ‘fair fuels’ as it 
seeks to ensure that biofuels that are produced in or imported into the internal market 
indeed result in reduced GHG emissions (in comparison to conventional motor fuel) 
and do not cause various adverse environmental consequences such as biodiversity 
                                                 
4
 Mol, ibid., Page 66.  
5
 The term “politically instituted market” refers to “…the political construction of specified products 
or services to be provided by market actors for consumers through the market organisation of 
exchange”. The carbon market is another example of a politically instituted market; it only exists by 
virtue of a politically constructed product (the carbon credit) to be exchanged under the Kyoto Protocol 
or the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme; Sarah Pilgrim and Mark Harvey, “Battles over 
Biofuels in Europe: NGOs and the Politics of Markets”, Sociological Research Online 15(3)(4), August 
2010, section 2.2.  
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loss.  
 
This article critically examines the EU sustainability regime and analyses the 
following issues. First, while there are obvious advantages to the ‘meta-standard’ 
approach adopted by the European regulators, the heavy reliance on private 
certification schemes along a complex supply chain is a cause of concern. The close 
resemblance between the role of Designated Operational Entities (DOEs) in the Kyoto 
Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and the private certification 
schemes in the EU sustainability regime allows for a useful comparison to be drawn 
in order to gain insight into the performance of the certification schemes which will 
ultimately determine whether the EU sustainability regime will have any positive 
effect on managing the environmental and social externalities of global biofuels 
production. Using the principal-agent framework developed in delegation theory, this 
article argues that the potential for rent-seeking behaviour by the biofuels certification 
scheme operators is determined by several related factors. These factors include the 
need for certification schemes to maintain their legitimacy, the oversight role and 
enforcement capabilities of the Commission, and the involvement of other actors such 
as environmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and international 
organisations in monitoring the certification schemes. This article argues that, taking 
these factors into account, the certification schemes are less likely to engage in 
rent-seeking behaviour than DOEs in the CDM context.  
  
Part I provides a brief background on biofuels and the sustainability concerns 
associated with their production. Part II examines the EU sustainability regime which 
creates a transnational governance framework involving a regional bloc, States, 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and businesses in a hybrid regulatory model 
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combining elements of private certification and public authority. Following an 
analysis of the meta-standard approach, the role of the DOEs and the certification 
schemes in their respective regulatory contexts will be examined. It will be argued 
that the comparison between the DOEs and the certification schemes is valid because 
the institutional structures in which they are embedded possess a high degree of 
similarity. However, there are also significant differences that point towards the 
conclusion that the problems that threaten the environmental integrity of the CDM are 
less likely to emerge in the EU biofuels context. Part III concludes.   
 
 At this juncture, it will probably be helpful to clarify some of the nomenclature 
adopted in this article. This article’s analysis of biofuels governance centres on the 
study of the implementing regime: the social institution that consists of agreed-upon 
principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures and programs that govern the 
interactions of actors in this specific issue area.6 Thus, the term ‘sustainability 
regulatory regime’ is a broad reference to the rules, practices and actors that constitute 
the EU biofuels governance system. The formal rules or legislation that implement the 
EU biofuels policy are known as the ‘Sustainability Criteria’, adopting the term used 
in the Renewable Energy Directive, and will be discussed in detail in Part II of this 
article. Thirdly, the ‘certification schemes’ are the equivalent of eco-labelling schemes 
that put the Sustainability Criteria into practice through certification. These schemes 
must be formally recognised by the Commission for their certification to bear 
meaning under the EU biofuels regulatory regime. Finally, the parties that create and 
implement a biofuels certification scheme are referred to as a collective ‘certification 
scheme operator’. Again, these intricacies will be analysed in Part II of this article. 
                                                 
6
 Oran R. Young, “Rights, Rules and Resources in World Affairs” in Global Governance: Drawing 
Insights from the Environmental Experience, Oran R Young (ed.) (MIT Press, 1997), page 6.  
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Part I: The Environmental Concerns Surrounding Increased Biofuels Production  
  
 Biofuels are derived from plants, animals, organic wastes, and micro-organisms 
(collectively referred to as biomass). Bioethanol and biodiesel are the dominant types 
of biofuels for transport.7 The United States (US), Brazil and the EU dominate world 
production of transport biofuels.8 The two leading ethanol producers are the United 
States and Brazil, which produced 26.8 million tones and 21.3 million tonnes 
respectively in 2008, comprising 91% of global ethanol production.9 The US is the 
largest consumer at 28.4 million tonnes (4.6% is imported), while the EU consumes 
about 2.6 million tonnes.10 The EU is responsible for two-thirds of global biodiesel 
production. In 2008, it produced 7.8 million tonnes while consuming 9.2 million 
tonnes.11 The other main biodiesel producers include Argentina, the US and Brazil, 
and international trade in biodiesel has been increasing steadily since 2005. In 2009, 
the export of biodiesel from Argentina to the EU increased from 70,000 tonnes in 
2008 to approximately 1 million tonnes.12 Essentially, the production of biofuels for 
transport involves the conversion of various plant crops into products that can replace 
petrol and diesel to power vehicles. Thus, the US is the main producer of ethanol from 
                                                 
7
 Towards Sustainable Production and Use of Resources: Assessing Biofuels, United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP), 2009, page 34.   
8
 Ibid. 
9
 Kees Kwant et al, “Overview of World Bioenergy Trade: IEA Task 40”, presented at “Developing 
Sustainable Trade in Bioenergy” workshop held alongside International Energy Agency Bioenergy 
Exco65, Nara, Japan, 12-14 May 2010, available online: 
http://www.ieabioenergy.com/DocSet.aspx?id=6568 (accessed on 20 March 2011), slide 12.  
10
 Ibid. It should be noted that data related to bioethanol trade is imprecise because there are various 
potential end-uses for ethanol such as industrial applications and the lack of proper codes for biofuels. 
11
 Kees Kwant et al, supra note 9, slide 13.  
12
 Ibid.  
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corn, Brazil produces ethanol mainly from sugar cane, while the EU produces 
biodiesel primarily from rapeseed.13 In the jargon, these plant crops are referred to as 
feedstock and the environmental concerns arise from the feedstock production 
process.  
 
As concerns about climate change and energy security dovetailed in the past 
decade, governments encouraged the production and use of biofuels as a fossil fuel 
alternative, leading to the development of an industry worth some five billion euros 
annually.14 Policies including blending quotas or targets and price support 
mechanisms were introduced to stimulate demand in many jurisdictions. By 2006, at 
least thirty-six provinces/municipalities and seventeen countries had introduced 
mandates for blending biofuels into vehicle fuels.15 For example, in 2005, Congress 
adopted the United States’ first federal Renewable Fuel Standard which required 
gasoline importers, blenders and refiners to blend up to 4 billion gallons of biofuels 
into gasoline in 2005 and to increase the amount up to 7.5 billion gallons by 2012.16 
The success of the Renewable Fuel Standard led to the introduction of more ambitious 
blending requirements in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007.17 The 
                                                 
13
 UNEP, supra note 7. “The development of the biodiesel industry in Europe is an important reason 
why rapeseed production in Europe has been maintained at current levels despite the reduced support 
levels for oilseeds under Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reforms”; see US Department of 
Agriculture (Foreign Agricultural Service, Production Estimates and Crop Assessment Division), 
“Rapeseed Production May Benefit from New EU Directive”, 4 November 2003, available online: 
http://www.fas.usda.gov/pecad2/highlights/2003/11/biodieseldirective/ (accessed on 20 March 2011). 
14 “EU draft reveals biofuels’ ‘environmental damage’”, Pete Harrison, Reuters, 4 March 2010. 
15
 Most mandates require blending 10%-15% ethanol with gasoline, or blending 2%-5% biodiesel with 
petroleum diesel; UNEP, supra note 7. page 35.  
16
 Energy Policy Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. Section 7545(o) (2006).  
17
 The petroleum industry is required to blend at least 36 billion gallons of biofuels into gasoline by 
2022; Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, Section 202.  
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Malaysian Biofuel Industry Act 2007 aims to facilitate development of the domestic 
biodiesel industry, specifically palm biodiesel, and biodiesel projects are eligible for 
tax incentives under the Promotion of Investments Act 1986.18 In the UK, supply of 
biofuels is encouraged by the Renewable Transport Fuels Obligation (RTFO). The 
RTFO requires 3.25% (by volume) of transport fuels to be delivered from renewable 
sources by 2009/10.19 
 
Carbon versus non-Carbon Sustainability Concerns  
 
 There is increasing evidence that the production of biofuels can come at 
high environmental and social costs. A distinction can be drawn between “carbon” 
and “non-carbon” sustainability concerns. Carbon concerns centre on the question of 
whether biofuels achieve net GHG savings compared with traditional fossil fuel usage. 
The amount of GHG emissions associated with biofuels production and consumption 
depends on the feedstock and the technology that is used to convert the feedstock into 
fuel. When land used for purposes such as food production is converted to biofuel 
feedstock production, negative GHG savings (ie: increased GHG emissions) may 
result. In short, when such “direct land use change” is taken into account when 
calculating the emissions savings throughout the production life cycle of biofuels, it 
may be observed that the production and consumption of biofuels is more 
carbon-intensive than that of conventional fossil fuels. Similarly, this phenomenon 
                                                 
18
 Malaysian Biofuel Industry Act 2007, Act 666, Laws of Malaysia. See “Biofuels at what cost? 
Government support for biodiesel in Malaysia”, Gregore Pio Lopez and Tara Laan, September 2008, an 
excellent analysis of the Malaysian biofuels industry, online: 
http://www.globalsubsidies.org/files/assets/Final_Malaysia_2.pdf (accessed on 20 September 2010).  
19
 The Renewable Transport Fuel Obligation (Amendment) Order 2009, pursuant to the Energy Act 
2004, “Amendment of article 4 (the renewable transport fuel obligation)”.  
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can be observed in the case of “indirect land use change” which refers to changes in 
land use that take place elsewhere as a result of the biofuels project.20 For example, 
food producers who have been displaced by the biofuel feedstock project may 
re-establish their operations elsewhere to make up for the shortfall in their production. 
Such indirect land use change, if it involves the destruction of carbon stocks in 
ecosystems such as grassland, peatland or wetlands, results in the release of 
significant GHG emissions. The problem is that the calculation of GHG emissions 
associated with land use change is complex and fraught with uncertainty. A number of 
scientific studies show very different results and thus are not conclusive on whether 
biofuels overall produce more GHG emissions than fossil fuels.21 
  
Currently, less than one percent (1%) of global agricultural land is used for 
cultivating biofuels feedstock crops and land use change associated with bioenergy 
represents a very small percentage of overall changes in land use.22 However, 
growing concern about the impact of large-scale biofuels production on issues 
including environmental sustainability, food security and human rights has prompted 
policymakers to examine these issues more closely. The European Commission, for 
example, has commissioned studies to better understand the phenomenon of indirect 
land use change.23  
                                                 
20
 Goran Berndes et al., “Bioenergy, Land Use Change and Climate Mitigation”, International Energy 
Agency Bioenergy and Swedish Energy Agency, January 2011, available online: 
http://www.task39.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=DXFvMlp43Yk%3D&tabid=4426&language=en-US 
(accessed on 20 March 2011) at page 4.  
21
 See discussion at pages 32-33 of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics report, “Biofuels: ethical issues” 
(April 2011), available online: www.nuffieldbioethics.org (accessed on 9 June 2011).  
22
 Ibid. 
23
 These studies are available online at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/renewables/studies/land_use_change_en.htm (accessed on 20 March 2011).  
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Apart from the issue of GHG emissions, the production of biofuels raises other 
environmental and social concerns (referred to as “non-carbon concerns”). As 
corporations and States respond to the upsurge in demand for biofuels by increasing 
supply, this has intensified environmental stress and given rise to deleterious effects 
on biological diversity, soil, air, and water resources. For example, the clearing of land 
in the Amazon region and Southeast Asia to plant soy and palm (two major biofuels 
feedstocks) has destroyed natural habitats and plant species. Further, labour 
exploitation, the use of child labour, the loss of land rights for indigenous peoples 
where new plantations to produce biofuels feedstock are established have been 
documented.24 Finally, the production of biofuels has been blamed for causing 
increases in the price of corn and other food staples by increasing competition for 
finite vital resources. 25 In 2008, when food prices were soaring, the United Nations 
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food Jean Ziegler labelled biofuels a ‘crime 
against humanity’ and demanded an international five-year ban on biofuels 
production.26 The consequences of biofuels production for food security are a matter 
of fierce debate which must be addressed in the quest for fair fuels.  
 
In the United Kingdom, concerns about the sustainability of biofuel productions 
led to the commission of a review by the UK Renewable Fuels Agency. The 
                                                 
24
 This list of direct effects is reproduced from “The Gallagher Review of the indirect effects of 
biofuels production” (Renewable Fuels Agency, United Kingdom, July 2008), page 18. Also see the 
case study on Brazil at pages 36-37 of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics report, “Biofuels: ethical 
issues” (April 2011), available online: www.nuffieldbioethics.org (accessed on 9 June 2011).  
25
 Ibid., page 19.  
26
 See Jean Ziegler, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, UN Human Rights Council, 
GE.08-10098 (E) 180108. 
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Gallagher Review of the indirect effects of biofuels production was published in July 
2008.27 Amongst its recommendations was that “[t]he introduction of biofuels should 
be significantly slowed until adequate controls to address displacement effects are 
implemented and are demonstrated to be effective”.28 The review concludes that “it 
should be possible to establish a genuinely sustainable industry provided that robust, 
comprehensive and mandatory sustainability standards are developed and 
implemented”29 (my emphasis) and “[t]he immediate focus for policy should be on 
implementing the necessary controls and conditions that will enable the industry to 
develop sustainably”.30 As we will see in Part II below, the EU has proceeded along 
with this approach in a broad manner with its sustainability scheme. 
 
 
Part II: The EU Biofuels Sustainability Regulatory Regime
 
 
    Part II begins by setting out the Sustainability Criteria applicable to biofuels sold 
in the EU. It then proceeds to examine the regulatory regime that has been developed 
to monitor and certify compliance with the Sustainability Criteria.31 A comparison 
will then be drawn between the sustainability regulatory regime and the CDM. In both 
cases, a public actor (the principal) has delegated certain regulatory tasks to a private 
                                                 
27
 “The Gallagher Review of the indirect effects of biofuels production”, supra note 24.  
28
 Ibid, page 8. 
29
 Ibid, page 9. 
30
 Ibid, page 10. 
31
 A broad definition of “regulation” is used in this article. Regulation, as defined by Scott, refers to 
“any process or set of processes by which norms are established, the behavior of those subject to the 
norms monitored or fed back into the regime, and for which there are mechanisms for holding the 
behavior of regulated actors within acceptable limits of the regime.”; Collin Scott, “Analysing 
Regulatory Space: Fragmented Resources and Institutional Design”, Public Law (Summer 2001) 329 at 
329. 
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actor (the agent) on the international level. The regulatory tasks involve monitoring 
and verifying complex and highly technical processes. More importantly, there are 
some fundamental structural issues in both the EU biofuels and CDM regulatory 
regimes that may contribute to the agents acting in rent-seeking ways, ultimately to 
the detriment of the environment.  
 
Based on insights drawn from the literature on delegation theory, this Part argues 
that there are in fact two levels of delegation in the EU biofuels context which limits 
the comparison that can be drawn with the CDM. Further, biofuels certification 
schemes are usually the result of collaboration amongst NGOs, businesses, 
government, and intergovernmental organisations concerned with sustainability in 
biofuels production. The parties that create and implement a biofuels certification 
scheme, i.e. the ‘certification scheme operator’, do not all share the profit-seeking 
motive, unlike DOEs, and have to maintain a level of environmental rigour or at least 
be seen to do so in order to maintain their legitimacy. Certification schemes, however, 
face other pressures such as the risk that members will exit a scheme when it no 
longer serves its purposes such as guaranteeing access to markets.32 As such, while a 
valid comparison can be drawn between DOEs and the certification scheme operators 
and the same problems that have threatened the integrity of the CDM may arise in the 
EU biofuels regulatory regime, this article argues that the extent to which the 
activities of the certification schemes will diverge from the aims of the European 
Commission will be smaller than the case of the DOEs in relation to the CDM 
Executive Board. The certification scheme operators are less able to engage in 
rent-seeking behaviour because they operate in a less monopolistic environment than 
                                                 
32
 Donald H. Schepers, “Challenges to Legitimacy at the Forest Stewardship Council” (2010) 92 
Journal of Business Ethics 279-290 at 282-3.  
 13 
DOEs currently do, for example. Further, the Commission is better placed than the 
CDM Executive Board to control the agent’s behaviour because it has a wider 
enforcement toolkit, more experience and legitimacy.  
 
The Article 17 Sustainability Criteria  
 
The Renewable Energy Directive (RED) forms part of a ‘far-reaching package of 
proposals that will deliver on the European Union's ambitious commitments to fight 
climate change and promote renewable energy up to 2020 and beyond’.33 What is 
relevant for present purposes is the ten percent (10%) target laid down in Article 3(4): 
“Each Member State shall ensure that the share of energy from renewable sources in 
all forms of transport in 2020 is at least 10 % of the final consumption of energy in 
transport in that Member State”.  
 
  Article 17 sets out the sustainability standards for biofuels, both imported and 
domestically produced within the EU.34 It should be noted that a type of biofuel can 
be imported into the EU even if it does not meet the sustainability standards but 
compliance is required in order for the biofuel in question to count towards attainment 
of EU or national renewable energy obligations or to be eligible for financial 
support.35 As the Sustainability Criteria were adopted under Article 95 of the EC 
                                                 
33
 Directive 2009/28/EC on the promotion of energy from renewable sources OJ [2009] L145/16. See 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/climate_action.htm for details of the European Union’s climate 
and renewable energy policy package (accessed on 20 December 2010) (hereinafter referred to as the 
Renewable Energy Directive).  
34
 The criteria is also set out in the Fuel Quality Directive (Article 7(b) of Directive 98/70/EC as 
amended by Directive 2009/30/EC) for consistency.  
35
 Directive 2009/28, Article 17(1).  
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Treaty, Member States are not permitted to adopt additional criteria or exclude 
biofuels on sustainability grounds other than those set out in the RED.36  
 
The Sustainability Criteria are as follows:  
 
1. Sustainably produced biofuels must achieve GHG emissions savings of at least 
35%, rising to 50% from 2017. From 1 January 2018, GHG savings must be at 
least 60% for biofuels produced in installations which started production after 1 
January 2017;37 
 
2. Sustainably produced biofuels must not derive from raw materials obtained from 
land enjoying high biodiversity value (such status as determined in January 2008), 
for example, primary forest and highly biodiverse grassland;38 
 
3. Sustainably produced biofuels must not be made from raw materials obtained 
from land with high carbon stock which refers to, for example, land which was 
considered wetlands and continuously forested areas in January 2008 and no 
longer has that status;39 
 
4. Sustainably produced biofuels must not be produced from crops grown on land 
that was peatland in January 2008, unless it is shown that cultivation of the crops 
did not involve draining previously undrained soil.40 
                                                 
36
 Paragraph 94 of the preamble to the directive.  
37
 Ibid, Article 17(2).  
38
 Ibid, Article 17(3).  
39
 Ibid, Article 17(4).  
40
 Ibid, Article 17(5).  
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The Commission is required to report to the European Parliament and the Council 
every two years on the implementation of measures taken to fulfill these 
Sustainability Criteria as well as the impact of the European Community’s biofuels 
policy on a range of concerns such as food prices in developing countries and 
land-use rights.41 The first reports are due in 2012.42  
 
Much debate surrounded these criteria during the legislative passage of the 
RED.43 The European Parliament’s Committee on Industry, Research and Energy 
took the lead in progressing the Commission’s proposed RED through Parliament and 
adopted a particularly strong stance on the Sustainability Criteria. The Committee 
would have added a ‘food policy constraint’ (that is, that the use of land for the 
production of biofuels should not be allowed to compete with the use of land for food 
production) and conditions relating to labour rights.44 However, after much debate 
about whether these proposed conditions could be implemented in practice and 
whether they would comply with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, they were 
eventually removed from the final text.  
 
 Thus, the EU has created a set of standards to guide the development of ‘fair 
biofuels’ but they are not mandatory and whether they can be considered robust and 
comprehensive is an open question. From the outset, the EU’s policy is laudable given 
that no other state or regional bloc has introduced similar sustainability standards. The 
                                                 
41
 Ibid, Article 17(7).  
42
 Ibid.  
43
 A. Swinbank, ‘EU Support for Biofuels and Bioenergy: “Environmental Sustainability” Criteria and 
Trade Policy’ (ICTSD Issue Paper No. 17, 2009) 6-8.  
44
 Ibid.  
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WTO concerns are valid and the scientific complexity of the sustainability issues 
raised by biofuels production renders it appropriate to approach the issue 
incrementally and in a cautious manner. However, the issues raised by the Committee 
on Industry, Research and Energy are critical and cannot be ignored simply because 
they raise complex policy-making conundrums. As a result, the Commission has had 
to undertake further (on-going) research to evaluate the most appropriate way to 
address indirect land use change, for example.45  
 
The Meta-Standard Approach 
  
The Commission does not directly test biofuels for compliance with the 
Sustainability Criteria. It relies on a number of certification schemes to do so. 
Certification schemes can be developed by industry, business alliances, environmental 
NGOs and inter-governmental organisations. The implementation of the Renewable 
Transport Fuels Obligation (RTFO) in the UK is also based on the meta-standard 
approach to sustainability. The list of certification schemes that have been approved 
by the Renewable Fuels Agency, known as qualifying standards, gives us a fairly 
good idea of the type of certification schemes that will be put forward for recognition 
by the Commission.46 The best known example will probably be the Forestry 
Stewardship Council or FSC as it is one of the earliest global sustainability standards 
                                                 
45
 “Report from the Commission on Indirect land-use change related to biofuels and bioliquids”, 22 
December 2010, COM(2010) 811 final. 
46
 The list of qualifying standards can be found at 
http://www.renewablefuelsagency.gov.uk/page/qualifying-standards-summary (accessed on 15 
February 2011).  
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to be developed.47 Another is the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil which counts 
banks, investors, industry, and NGOs amongst its members and was set up to address 
the “urgent and pressing global call for sustainably produced palm oil”.48 
 
The use of the term “certification scheme” 
 
According to the guidance issued by the Commission (hereinafter 
“Commission’s Guidance”), economic operators can demonstrate compliance with the 
Sustainability Criteria through the use of any ‘voluntary scheme’ that is recognised by 
the Commission for this purpose.49 It should be clarified at this juncture that the term 
‘voluntary scheme’ is used in the Commission Guidelines and the Renewable Energy 
Directive to refer to certification schemes that “[set] standards for the production of 
biomass products”. These schemes can be distinguished from the bilateral or 
multilateral agreements containing provisions on sustainability that the European 
Community is committed to reaching with other jurisdictions.50  
 
The reference to the ‘voluntary’ nature of these certification schemes alludes to 
the fact that most certification schemes for biofuels and related sectors such as 
agriculture and forestry are market-driven (by consumer demand and the rise of the 
corporate social responsibility ethos) and participation by companies is usually 
                                                 
47
 For an excellent discussion of the FSC, see Steven Bernstein and Benjamin Cashore, “Nonstate 
Global Governance: Is Forest Certification a Legitimate Alternative to a Global Forest Convention?” in 
John Kirton and Michael J. Trebilcock (eds), Hard Choices, Soft Law: Voluntary Standards In Global 
Trade, Environment And Social Governance (Ashgate Publishing, 2004). 
48
 See www.rspo.org for more information.  
49
 Paragraph 2.2. of the Communication from the Commission on voluntary schemes and default 
values in the EU biofuels and bioliquids sustainability scheme (OJ 2010/C 160/01).   
50
 Directive 2009/28, Article 18(4). 
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voluntary rather than mandated by law.51 For the sake of clarity, however, this article 
consistently refers to certification schemes as such rather than adopt the term 
‘voluntary scheme’.  
 
Benchmarking 
 
Presently, the certification schemes can broadly be broken down into two groups – 
those developed with biofuels in mind, often focusing on a particular feedstock, and 
those designed with a broader agricultural remit but that still meet the requirements of 
the Sustainability Criteria. The schemes are at different stages of development. While 
most of them have been in operation for some time, some are still being developed.  
Only certification schemes recognised by the Commission (through the process 
of ‘benchmarking’) will be qualified to certify biofuels for their compliance with the 
Sustainability Criteria. The ‘benchmarking’ process considers both the criteria 
covered by the certification scheme and robustness of the checks that are in place. 
When the Sustainability Criteria and its indicators are sufficiently met by a 
benchmarked certification scheme, an economic operator that is certified by this 
scheme will be able to demonstrate full compliance with the Sustainability Criteria. 
When the Sustainability Criteria and its indicators are insufficiently or partially met 
by a benchmarked certification scheme, the Commission can still confer recognition 
on the scheme but an economic operator that relies on this certification scheme will be 
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20 December 2010).  
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required to carry out supplementary checks on the compliance gaps. For example, the 
FSC’s criteria mainly refer to forests and not to grasslands.52 There are also no 
references to wetlands and peatlands in the FSC’s criteria.53 Therefore, FSC 
certification has been recognised by the UK Renewable Fuels Agency as a qualifying 
standard, but a biofuels producer that is FSC-certified will have to carry out 
supplementary checks to address the compliance gaps pertaining to peatlands and 
wetlands. Another example is the Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels (RSB). With its 
tight focus on developing standards for sustainable biofuels production, the RSB fully 
meets all the Sustainability Criteria and its indicators.54 An economic operator 
certified by RSB will therefore demonstrate full compliance with the Sustainability 
Criteria.   
This system of benchmarking reflects the on-going efforts to develop appropriate 
certification schemes at this relatively early stage by drawing on the technical 
expertise and experience of earlier certification schemes such as the FSC (which was 
developed mainly to address illegal timber logging), encouraging such schemes to 
improve compliance with the Sustainability Criteria, and promoting the development 
of biofuels-specific certification schemes. Commonsense assumes that an economic 
operator will look for the most comprehensive standard to avoid the hassle of 
supplementary checks. In turn, certification standards will seek full compliance with 
the Sustainability Criteria to be more competitive. However, as biofuels certification 
is an emerging practice, it will take time for such efficiency to be achieved. A few 
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 Renewable Fuels Agency (RFA), “RFA benchmarks of sustainability assurance schemes against the 
RED”, available online: 
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on_150710.pdf (accessed on 16 June 2011).  
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 Ibid.  
54
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factors hinder the realization of this ideal scenario. For one, a company may have to 
maintain certification by a sustainable forestry standard to continue selling to 
companies that demand such certification but will also have to seek additional 
certification by another standard to cater to the EU biofuels sector. The company is 
better off being certified only by the forestry scheme and carrying out supplementary 
checks for EU market access rather than face the costly and time-consuming prospect 
of multiple certification. For the forestry standard, it specializes in forestry practices 
and may want to continue to build on this comparative advantage rather than improve 
its biofuel benchmark rating at the risk of spreading its resources too thinly. 
Certification schemes that only partially meet the Sustainability Criteria will therefore 
continue to exist.  
To demonstrate independence and transparency, certification schemes, in turn, 
require auditing by third-party entities such as consultants before it affixes its 
“approved” seal on the biofuel product. Dehue at al have described this mode of 
regulation as one based on a ‘meta-standard’: “Instead of requiring producers to be 
certified to the Meta-Standard directly, compliance with the Meta-Standard can be 
achieved through certification to existing standards which have proven to provide a 
sufficient guarantee that (most of) the…criteria of the Meta-Standard are complied 
with”. 55 In short, the architecture of this regime rests on meta-standard certification 
by the European Commission of certification schemes that can be private, public or 
both in nature. The responsibility of monitoring and verification is divided amongst 
myriad actors, some of which will have to possess highly technical expertise and local 
knowledge in order to certify compliance ‘on the ground’. The following sub-sections 
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elaborate on this meta-standard regime.  
 
The role of the Commission 
 
When the Commission receives a request for recognition of a certification 
scheme, it will assess whether the scheme fulfils the sustainability criteria and the 
assessment and recognition requirements set out in the Commission’s Guidance. 
According to paragraph 2(1) of the Commission’s Guidance, the Commission will 
assess a scheme regardless of its origin (i.e., whether developed by government or 
private organisations, and regardless of whether another recognised scheme already 
covers the same type of feedstock or geographical area. The Commission is clearly 
keen to recognise a broad range of standards so that economic operators will be able 
to seek certification from scheme(s) that suit their specific needs thereby reducing the 
administrative burden upon them. While the Sustainability Criteria do not include 
concerns such as food security, the Commission has to address these sustainability 
issues through its reports to the Council and Parliament. In this regard, the 
Commission intends to assess whether a scheme seeking recognition can also serve as 
a source of accurate data on these sustainability issues.  
 
After the assessment process is completed, the Commission will formally adopt a 
decision which will be published in the Official Journal and referred to on the 
Commission's transparency platform. The decision will specify the part(s) of the 
Sustainability Criteria covered by a certification scheme and if the scheme provides 
any additional information on the other sustainability issues. The Guidance states that 
as a general rule, a certification scheme will be recognised for the maximum 
permitted period of five years. In the event that a certification scheme does not meet 
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the requirements, the Commission will inform the submitting organisation accordingly. 
Finally, the Commission should be informed of any changes that may affect the basis 
for initial recognition of the certification scheme so that the Commission is able to 
evaluate if the initial recognition is still valid.  
 
It should be noted that the Commission will not be conducting the assessment 
process on its own. The Commission is required to seek the opinion of the Committee 
on the Sustainability of Biofuels and Bioliquids established pursuant to Article 25(2) 
of the Renewable Energy Directive.56 This Committee comprises of representatives of 
the Member States and is chaired by a representative of the Commission.57 A draft of 
any measures to be taken must be submitted by the Commission to this Committee 
which will deliver its opinion (by voting, if necessary).58 The Commission is required 
to ‘take the utmost account of the opinion delivered by the committee… [and] shall 
inform the committee of the manner in which the opinion has been taken into 
account.59 The Commission is also required to inform the Parliament of committee 
proceedings on a regular basis.60 The Committee held its first meeting on 7 October 
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2010 to adopt its rules of procedure and to consider a draft Commission decision on 
the types of information to be submitted by economic operators to Member States.61 
Most of the organisations present at the meeting were ministries of transport, energy, 
environment and industry.62  
 
The Role of the Certification Schemes 
 
In the biofuels meta-standard regulatory architecture, the Commission has 
outsourced verification responsibilities to certification schemes which qualify for the 
job by meeting, in part or whole, the Sustainability Criteria. The importance of the 
auditing processes being carried out with the highest degree of professional integrity 
cannot be overstated. Borrowing the language used in the official press release 
announcing the contents of the Commission Guidance, “[o]ne of the main criteria is 
that [the certification schemes] have independent auditors which check the whole 
production chain, from the farmer and the mill, via the trader, to the fuel supplier who 
delivers petrol or diesel to the filling station. The Communication sets standards 
requiring this auditing to be reliable and fraud-resistant” (my emphasis).63  
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From the outset, a certification scheme is expected to ensure that economic 
operators are audited before they are permitted to join the scheme.64 Subsequently, 
economic operators should be audited at least annually and the Commission permits 
the auditing process to be limited to a sample group, with different economic 
operators forming the sample size each time. The auditor should be external (ie: the 
audit is not performed by the economic operator or the certification scheme itself), 
independent (ie: the auditor is independent of the activity being audited and free from 
conflict of interest), and possesses the requisite skills to carry out such audits. An 
example of how an auditor can demonstrate that it possesses the requisite skills is that 
it is accredited to carry out audits in accordance with ISO (International Organisation 
for Standardisation) 19011 establishing guidelines for quality and/or environmental 
management systems auditing.65 An auditor must also be capable of carrying out a 
risk analysis, propose a verification plan and seek the requisite evidence from the 
economic operator before issuing verification conclusions. The onus is on an 
economic operator that is seeking certification to maintain operating systems that are 
auditable and to prepare the information for auditing purposes.66 
 
Benefits of the Meta-Standard Approach 
 
 There are some clear advantages to the meta-standard approach. Many 
certification schemes (the FSC, the Sustainable Agriculture Network/Rainforest 
Alliance (SAN), the Basel Criteria for Responsible Soy Production, just to name a 
few) developed by civil society organisations and business alliances to promote 
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sustainable practices in feedstock production already exist. The use of a meta-standard 
essentially avoids reinventing the wheel, and in turn, saves time and costs. 
Developing a certification scheme through a multi-stakeholder process can take 
several years of bargaining and scientific testing. It also takes a long time for 
certification schemes to gain legitimacy and producer acceptance. Existing 
sustainability certification schemes already have that. Voluntary certification as a 
business practice does not normally fall foul of international trade rules. As such, the 
use of a meta-standard for biofuels certification also reduces the likelihood of falling 
foul of World Trade Organization rules which prohibit the use of technical regulations 
as non-tariff trade barriers and discriminatory treatment of imported products.67 
Finally, the promulgation of a meta-standard by a major market like the EU will 
contribute to the harmonization of standards and reduce the problems created by a 
proliferation of certification schemes. The existence of a plethora of certification 
schemes has caused producers and operators concern about the prohibitive costs 
associated with multiple certification (which will have a disproportionate effect on 
small-scale producers in developing countries) and how voluntary standards fit into 
regulatory regimes.68 The creation of meta-standards which act as benchmarking 
systems provides some consolidation of the voluntary standards market.69 
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Comparing the EU Biofuels Sustainability Scheme and the Clean Development 
Mechanism 
 
The close resemblance between the role of DOEs in the Kyoto Protocol’s CDM 
and the certification schemes in the EU sustainability scheme allows for a useful 
comparison to be drawn. The aim is to establish the likelihood that problems similar 
to the DOE- related issues that have threatened the environmental integrity of the 
CDM system will emerge in the biofuels context and to explore the ramifications of 
such findings. The delegation theory offers a framework for this discussion. This 
section begins with a succinct account of the key aspects of the delegation theory. 
This is followed by a brief account of the principal-agent relationship engendered by 
the delegation of power from the CDM Executive Board to the DOEs. We then 
compare the DOEs and the certification schemes in their respective regulatory 
contexts. The central argument is that the potential for rent-seeking behaviour by the 
biofuels certification scheme operators is restricted by the need for certification 
schemes to maintain their legitimacy and the Commission’s ability to monitor the 
behaviour of these schemes.  
 
Delegation 
 
Delegation theory was originally developed in new institutional economics in 
the 1970s, and has only recently been used to explain the principal-agent relationship 
between states and international organisations.70 Hawkins et al define delegation as ‘a 
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conditional grant of authority from a principal to an agent that empowers the latter to 
act on behalf of the former. This grant of authority is limited in time or scope and 
must be revocable by the principal’.71  
 
Why delegate? 
 
Efficiency arguments constitute the main explanation for why a principal 
would choose to delegate powers to an agent at the international level. First, the 
principal may gain benefits from the division of labour and consequent specialization. 
The principal might wish to utilize the expertise that an agent possesses and not incur 
the costs of developing the expertise itself. Secondly, the principal may simply lack 
the economic or technical capacity to perform the task and therefore has to delegate it 
to an agent. Thirdly, private actors may be more efficient than public actors in 
carrying out governance because they are less bureaucratic and must work more 
efficiently in order to survive in a competitive environment. Finally, delegation can 
lower the costs of cooperation by facilitating collective decision-making and locking 
in certain common practices. However, it is salient to note that delegation does not 
necessarily enhance efficiency in all instances. As Donnelly puts it, “a mistake often 
made is to assume that private delegation will enhance efficiency, rather than realizing 
that private delegation may enhance efficiency and effectiveness when it is 
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accompanied by a complex array of favorable conditions, such as a strong supervisory 
framework and satisfactory market conditions” (italics original).72 
 
Drawbacks 
 
There are two main disadvantages of delegating to an agent. First, there is the 
obvious reduction in the principal’s autonomy when decision-making authority is 
delegated to the agent. Secondly, agents often have their own agenda and it is hard for 
the principal to determine whether the agent is pursuing its own interests at the 
principal’s expense because the principal can never have a better understanding of the 
agent’s interests and actions than the agent itself. Epstein and O'Halloran argue, for 
example, that ‘principals can usually mitigate conflicts of interest through the careful 
design of incentive contracts but can rarely control agents perfectly’.73 This 
information asymmetry between the principal and agent has two consequences. First, 
central to the concept of delegation is that the principal can withdraw the grant of 
authority anytime when it perceives the costs of delegation to outweigh the benefits. 
However, with insufficient information vis-à-vis the agent, the principal will find it 
difficult to know when to exercise this power of withdrawing the delegated authority.  
Secondly, the combination of information asymmetry and divergence between the 
interests of the principal and the agent (for example, profit maximization) increases 
the risk of ‘slack’ or undesired behavior on the part of the agent.74 According to this 
line of logic, the agent will act in accordance with the principal’s preferences only if it 
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is advantageous for it to do so. As such, the incentive structure of the principal-agent 
relationship requires careful design to align the preferences of the two actors.  
 
Detailed Rules versus Broad Principles 
 
There are two ways in which the principal-agent relationship can be structured 
to minimize the risk of slack. The principal can set out detailed rules that prescribe the 
agent’s course of action in various factual contexts (rule-based delegation).75 
Alternatively, the principal can lay down broad principles and allow the agent 
discretion to decide how best to carry out the task at hand.76 The disadvantage of 
rule-based delegation is that the principal must develop the necessary expertise to 
write the rules, thereby incurring costs and reducing the specialization gains of 
delegation. Rule-based delegation also introduces a degree of inflexibility into the 
regulatory system and restricts the agent’s ability to respond effectively to change. 
The proliferation of rules can lead to uncertain and inconsistent application, thereby 
frustrating regulatory goals.77 On the other hand, when broad principles are used to 
guide the exercise of delegated authority, accountability mechanisms are required to 
perform checks and balances on the agent’s exercise of its discretionary powers. 
Specific rules can also be beneficial in terms of bolstering the agent’s ability to 
maintain independence. In the financial auditing context, it has been observed that 
auditors may prefer specific standards as they provide better support when the auditor 
chooses to take a position that is contrary to the interests of its client but is in the 
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interests of its principal, the corporate shareholders.78  
 
Police Patrols and Fire Alarms  
 
The principal can monitor the agent’s activities by ‘police patrols’ which refers 
to direct monitoring to identify malfeasance or by implementing a system of ‘fire 
alarms’ which relies on affected third parties to bring evidence of slack to the 
principal’s attention. A dispute settlement mechanism that gives affected third parties 
the right to bring proceedings is an example of a ‘fire alarm’. ‘Fire alarms’ are more 
effective and efficient to the extent that the principal does not have to spend resources 
searching for slack when none exists.79 However, they are an effective check on the 
agent’s behavior only if affected third parties have sufficient incentive to draw 
attention to the problem. Further, affected third parties must have sufficient 
information or knowledge to identify slack in the first place. ‘Police patrols’ and ‘fire 
alarms’ are not mutually exclusive monitoring techniques, and most regulators will 
use both to varying degrees.80 Finally, even in what appear to be self-regulatory 
systems, where rules and standards are not enforceable by a governmental authority, 
private firms may encounter internal policies, market pressures, reputational pressures, 
and informal norms that hold those firms accountable to their principals.81 
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Designated Operational Entities in the CDM world 
 
This section gives a succinct overview of the role of the DOE in the CDM 
regulatory structure. It will become clear that the DOE and the certification scheme 
are similarly situated in their respective regulatory contexts to justify comparison: the 
DOE/certification scheme acts as the agent for the CDM Executive Board/European 
Commission and it is in the very nature of principal-agent relationships, as the above 
account of the delegation theory informs us, that there always exists the potential for 
the agent to engage in rent-seeking behaviour (hence diverging from the principal’s 
preferences, which in the CDM and biofuel contexts, are assumed to be good 
regulatory performance and ultimately environmental integrity).  
 
Established as one of the three market mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol to 
help industrialized countries meet their emission reduction commitments in a 
cost-effective manner, the Clean Development Mechanism allows an Annex I Party to 
receive carbon credits (Certified Emission Reductions or CERs) for an investment in 
an emission reducing project in a developing country.82 One of the most innovative 
features of the CDM is the direct involvement of private entities in the compliance 
framework of the Kyoto Protocol. The CDM allows countries to authorize private 
sector entities to sell and acquire emission reductions from projects in developing 
countries. The CDM also outsources regulatory functions to private entities.  
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While the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to 
the Kyoto Protocol or the COP/MOP is the ultimate authority of the CDM, the 
day-to-day supervisory work is undertaken by the Executive Board.83 The Executive 
Board is composed of ten members and ten alternate members from Parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol who are nominated by the COP/MOP. The Executive Board is 
assisted by a number of panels and working groups as well as the DOEs. The DOEs 
have been described as the “so-called extended arm of the CDM’s supervisory 
executive board”.84 These third-party auditors are involved in two stages of the CDM 
project cycle: (1) the validation stage and (2) verification.85 At the validation stage, 
the responsibility of a DOE is to validate a CDM project by independently evaluating 
the project design against the CDM requirements, including a substantive review of 
the baseline and monitoring methodology, and assuring that an adequate monitoring 
plan is in place to safeguard against the overstatement of emissions reductions.86 At 
the verification stage, another DOE is supposed to verify the amount of emissions 
reductions before it submits a report to the CDM Executive Board accompanied by a 
request for the issuance of CERs. DOEs are only permitted to validate or verify 
projects within the “sectoral scopes” for which they are accredited. For example, a 
DOE accredited to evaluate waste handling projects is not permitted to evaluate 
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energy projects unless it is accredited to do so. 
 
The DOE as agent of the CDM Executive Board  
 
Green theorises that there are two levels of delegation in the CDM context. 
The first is the delegation of authority from the COP/MOP to the CDM Executive 
Board, and the second is the delegation of monitoring and verification functions from 
the CDM Executive Board to the DOEs. However, the principal-agent relationship is 
really the latter one as the MOP and CDM Executive Board may be said to be a 
collective principal sharing similar preferences.87 We adopt Green’s argument in this 
article, therefore ‘principal’ refers to the Executive Board and ‘agent’ refers to the 
DOE.  
 
There is a growing body of literature on the problematic nature of the CDM, 
and relevant to present purposes, the regulatory performance of the DOEs.88 Green, 
for example, argues that even though the CDM was designed in a way to maximize 
the Executive Board's control over the DOEs and many of the oversight procedures in 
place appear to be functioning well, there are some fundamental structural issues that 
may contribute to the DOEs acting in rent-seeking ways (e.g., signing off on projects 
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that may not abate GHG emissions or do not abate at the level stated in the project's 
documentation).89 The monopolistic nature of the DOE market is one such structural 
issue. For example, while the CDM rules require different DOEs to validate and 
verify each project to avoid potential conflict of interest, the small number of 
accredited DOEs has meant that it has sometimes been impossible to find two 
different DOEs to abide by this rule. There is a provision in the CDM rules that allows 
for exceptions, and Green’s analysis shows that it is invoked quite frequently. 27% of 
all projects for which credits have been issued were validated and verified by the 
same DOE.90 Her study also shows that the three most active DOEs often validate or 
verify each others’ projects. This increases the potential payoff of reciprocity. Since it 
is very likely that one of two firms will be verifying the work of the third, there is a 
benefit to approving their projects, as well as a potential cost to not doing so.91  
 
Dyck’s research on the DOEs’ implementation of their mandate has yielded 
interesting findings. He identified a number of factors that affect the accountability of 
DOEs. First, there is the potential conflict of interest created by the profit-making 
motive. While the DOEs owe a duty to the Executive Board and some do perceive 
themselves as an extension of the Executive Board (that is, as playing a 
quasi-regulatory rule), they are susceptible to coercion in their business relationships 
with project developers.92 Dyck notes that there are rumours that project developers 
have refused to pay DOEs for their services because of negative validations. DOEs 
are also concerned that stringent verification will lead to the loss of future business 
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opportunities. Overall, Dyck did not find widespread evidence of overt manipulation, 
but considerable implicit economic pressure, especially on issues where the validation 
and verification standards are unclear. In such cases, depending on the type and size 
of the project developer, it may try to influence the assessor/auditors’s opinion and is 
able to do so as it wields power such as the implicit threat to withdraw the project or 
future ones from that DOE.93 Dyck also suggests that repeat relationships between a 
DOE and a project developer raise independence concerns. Given that many DOEs 
receive the bulk of their business from a few large project developers, there may be 
pressure on the DOEs to issue positive valuations in order to retain those limited 
clients.94  
 
The Certification Scheme Operator as Agent of the Commission 
 
At first glance, many of the issues raised above in relation to the DOEs will 
appear to parallel similar concerns about the biofuel certification scheme operators. 
This is not surprising given the clearly established principal-agent relationship in both 
contexts and the reliance on private agents which potentially face conflicts of interest 
in carrying out their quasi-regulatory functions because of their profit-making motive. 
In the case of the EU sustainability scheme, one could argue that the European 
Parliament has delegated biofuels regulation to the Commission, but this article will 
focus on the relationship between the regulatory, rather than legislative, bodies and 
private recipients of delegated regulatory functions. The Commission has delegated 
authority to certification scheme operators because of the large amount of resources 
that would be required to verify each biofuel operator. The Commission will also be 
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better off tapping the expertise of environmental consultants and certification schemes 
that will be more familiar with the local conditions in biofuel producer countries 
outside the EU.  
 
 
Comparing the DOEs and the Certification Scheme Operators 
 
A salient distinction between the CDM and the biofuels regulatory structures lies 
in the levels of delegation. In the EU biofuels regulatory regime, there are two levels 
of delegation which must be considered. There is one level of delegation from the 
European Commission to the operators of recognised certification schemes, and 
another level of delegation from the certification scheme operators to independent 
third-party auditing firms.  
 
For the second level of delegation, some of the problems that beset the DOEs 
may also apply to the environmental consultancies that audit the performance of the 
biofuels producers. These problems include the incentive for environmental 
consultancies to apply less stringent standards because of their forward-looking 
concern to retain business, the relatively small number of environmental auditing 
firms in the market which increases the potential for collusion and other monopolistic 
tendencies, and the wide latitude for advocacy by the biofuels producer to influence 
the auditor’s assessment given the fluidity of the standards applied by certification 
schemes and ultimately, the EU Sustainability Criteria. It can also be argued that 
 37 
auditing firms can never be independent if their services are paid for by the auditee.95 
As a federal judge noted in a U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission roundtable 
discussion on financial auditing reform, the idea of a company hiring and paying its 
own watchdogs is as if an author hired his book reviewers or a slaughterhouse hired 
its meat inspectors.96 In the biofuels certification context, the economic operator 
seeking certification hires the auditing firm. The certification schemes have 
procedures and regulations that seek to ensure that auditing firms are independent and 
free from conflicts of interest.97 For example, the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm 
Oil (RSPO) has a detailed set of auditing firm requirements and conducts training 
workshops for auditors to familiarise themselves with the RSPO certification 
requirements. Auditing firms for RSPO are themselves required to undergo third-party 
assessment by Accreditation Services International (ASI) and these assessment reports 
are made available on the RSPO website with an open invitation for feedback on the 
auditing firm in question.98 It is arguable that these mechanisms do not completely 
remove the perverse incentives created by the economic operator seeking certification 
hiring its auditing firm, and it is preferable that certification schemes pay for the 
auditing services instead. The key idea is that the certification scheme could be the 
proper principal for the auditing firm. This idea may take root eventually, but the 
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current practice in voluntary certification is that the company seeking certification 
hires the auditing firm. This leads us back to the point that at this second level of 
delegation of monitoring authority from the certification scheme operators to auditing 
firms, some of the problems that beset the DOEs due to potential conflicts of interest 
may also arise in the biofuels certification context.  
 
 At the first level of delegation, however, the principal-agent dynamics involving 
the Commission and the certification scheme operator are different. It can be argued 
that two key factors will serve to reduce the divergence in the preferences of the 
principal and agent: (1) the need for the certification scheme to maintain legitimacy 
and (2) the Commission’s greater capacity to monitor its agents in comparison to that 
of the CDM Executive Board.  
 
Legitimacy 
 
Certification schemes are usually privately organized and supported by coalitions 
of non-governmental organisations, firms, foundations. In fact, biofuels certification 
schemes belong to the fourth generation of business and NGO-defined sector-specific 
codes and labelling programmes as identified by Nadvi and Waltring.99 Fourth 
generation certification schemes share the characteristics of being formulated and 
implemented mainly through collaboration between NGOs and businesses. They 
feature third-party monitoring through auditors and, in general, are widely employed 
in highly globalised industries which involve substantive environmental risks such as 
chemicals, mining and forestry. Scholars have argued that risk and learning provide 
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the main sources of momentum behind the rise of certification schemes. Risk refers to 
both the economic risk of consumer boycott and the political risk of public 
regulation.100 Certification schemes and codes of conduct manage these risks by 
allowing businesses and industry sectors to convey information about environmental 
matters to governments and the public to demonstrate willingness to improve their 
behaviour.101 Further, it has been argued that learning has fostered the development 
of certification schemes as transnational epistemological communities of managers, 
consultants and certifiers have developed which foster awareness and the transfer of 
business practices.  
 
It can be argued that operators face two key incentives to promote the legitimacy 
of their certification schemes. Firstly, certification schemes must compete with each 
other for credibility and recognition, their raison d’etre.102 Companies depend on a 
certification scheme’s credibility to communicate a positive message about their 
environmental performance and recognition is vital for creating consumer demand for 
certified products. As these transnational governance regimes are neither elected nor 
representative (that is, in the same way that a government can only exist by 
democratic basis at the national level), the authority or credibility of certification 
schemes rests entirely on its moral legitimacy. Moral legitimacy would depend on the 
evaluation of outcomes, procedures, organisational structures, and fair representation 
of stakeholders.103  
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In relation to outcomes, a certification scheme that is recognised by the EU will 
be expected to promote and achieve compliance with the Sustainability Criteria. This 
expectation will be held by its members, environmental NGOs and the Commission. 
NGOs that participate in the formulation and implementation of certification schemes 
play an important role of “question[ing], [probing] and act[ing] as the green lobby” 
and in this way, “they lend the certification scheme legitimacy”.104 In other words, 
the NGOs defend the sustainability objective within the certification scheme and in 
this manner, reduce the likelihood of the certification scheme diverging from the 
Commission’s regulatory objective.  
 
As briefly mentioned earlier, industry members themselves have an interest in 
ensuring that a certification scheme is deemed credible and able to deliver premium 
prices on the goods certified by the scheme or secure access to certain markets. 
Highly visible public campaigns against prominent brands and major multinational 
corporations for their indirect involvement in environmentally destructive activities 
such as deforestation have also increased the stakes involved: industry, particularly in 
highly controversial sectors like palm oil, have an incentive to support credible 
certification schemes whose logos they can affix to their products to manage the 
pressures exerted by NGOs and consumers.105 Industry members are more likely to 
exit a scheme when the benefits of certification no longer outweigh the costs, for 
example, when certification does not guarantee a price premium because there is 
insufficient market demand for certified products.106 
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Thus, the need for certification schemes to maintain credibility in order to remain 
in the ‘marketplace’ leads to behaviour that enhances legitimacy. Such behaviour 
includes the operator pursuing or at least being seen to pursue environmental 
sustainability, which is an objective shared by the Commission. Using the delegation 
theory framework, the agent’s quest for legitimacy acts as a countervailing incentive 
against slack and, in fact, serves to align the preferences of the agent and the principal. 
This is in contrast with the DOEs in the CDM context. One can assume that DOEs, as 
third-party independent verifiers, should be concerned to maintain their legitimacy 
and reputational capital.107 It seems that the Executive Board’s relatively frequent 
resort to suspensions to sanction DOEs has reduced the reputations of all DOEs to the 
lowest common denominator. As such, while the DOEs recognise the importance of 
maintaining their reputation for independence and that suspension can adversely 
affect business, the reputational loss is somewhat less of a concern given the entire 
industry’s tainted reputation.108 The maintenance of reputational capital is a less 
effective countervailing incentive against rent-seeking behaviour than it could 
otherwise be.109 
 
The Commission’s Monitoring Capabilities  
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From the outset, the process of benchmarking and evaluation that is undertaken 
before the Commission recognises a certification scheme is perhaps the most carefully 
monitored component of the biofuels regulatory framework. This makes sense as 
careful screening of potential agents can help reduce the likelihood of the principal 
delegating to an agent with wide preference divergence.110 Depending on how 
stringent the Commission and its advisory committee are with their selection process, 
this stage could serve an effective gate-keeping function and ensure that certification 
schemes that share the Commission’s preference for the environmental integrity of 
biofuels production are recognised. 
 
As discussed above, a principal can monitor its agent’s activities through ‘fire 
alarms’ which rely on third parties to bring evidence of slack to the principal’s 
attention. In Europe, a consortium of NGOs has been actively involved in shaping 
biofuels policy.111 This consortium includes two influential critics of biofuels, 
Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, which have been putting pressure on 
governments to drop biofuels targets and suggesting that biofuels cause more 
problems than they solve. Heavy lobbying by this consortium has had considerable 
influence on EU biofuels policy and we can expect that these NGOs will continue to 
monitor the implementation of the Sustainability Criteria with a critical and vigilant 
eye. They are the most likely entities to trigger ‘fire alarms’ and alert the Commission 
of any slack on the part of the certification schemes. Further, a noteworthy feature of 
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the Commission is the extent to which it is open to external influences. A study has 
shown that Commission officials spend almost forty percent (40%) of their time on 
policy-related matters with people outside the Commission.112 Chalmers and Tomkins 
suggest that ‘[t]he problem is frequently not that [the Commission] does not listen, but 
rather to whom it listens’.113 For present purposes, the salient point is that NGOs are 
likely to play an important monitoring role in the EU biofuels regulatory regime. In 
comparison, NGOs have played a more muted role in the CDM context, an issue to 
which we shall turn our attention. 
 
The environmental NGOs that engage in the institutionalized global politics of 
climate change fall into a few broad categories. There are the transnational coalitions 
linking many local NGOs under an ‘umbrella’ organisation to optimise on economies 
of scale. The network acts as a collective voice for the environmental community at 
international treaty negotiations. It also provides a forum for sharing ideas, debating 
issues and developing strategies to influence the process and outcome of treaty 
negotiations; the Climate Action Network is a good example of this type of 
transnational network actor.114 There are the NGOs with an established presence in 
many jurisdictions and their headquarters or most well-resourced office in Europe or 
                                                 
112
 L. Hooghe, “The European Commission and the Integration of Europe” (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), page 41, cited in D. Chalmers and A. Tomkins, “European Union Public Law: 
Texts and Materials” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), page 92.  
113
 D. Chalmers and A. Tomkins, “European Union Public Law: Texts and Materials” (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), page 92.  
114
 Michele M. Betsill, “Transnational Actors in International Environmental Politics” in Michele M. 
Betsill, Kathryn Hochstetler and Dimitris Stevis (eds.), “International Environmental Politics” 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), page 189.  
 44 
America, such as Greenpeace and World Wildlife Fund (WWF).115 There are the 
many local and regional NGOs that lobby for developing country concerns such as 
funding for climate change mitigation and adaptation. Finally, there are the 
specialised NGOs which focus on specific issue areas in climate politics such as CDM 
Watch which was established in 2009 at the initiative of international NGOs to act as 
“a unique watchdog in the carbon market”. CDM Watch declares itself as operating 
on three levels: “(1) Exposing flaws in international fora including UNFCCC 
conferences and CDM Executive Board meetings where CDM rules and the future of 
the CDM is being decided; (2) Closely watching credit buyers and the European 
decision making process around carbon offsets at European level; and (3) 
Empowering local communities and NGOs in the vicinities of projects, to understand 
the international carbon market and the enshrined public participation rights”.116 
Sandbag is a UK-based NGO that tracks the development of emissions trading, 
specifically the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) and the CDM. 
Again, the organisation seeks ‘..to act as a watchdog to ensure the schemes have 
integrity’.117  
 
NGOs like CDM Watch and Sandbag address the problematic that the CDM 
decision-making processes lack transparency despite formal legal provisions for 
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public participation, and the need to make emissions trading understandable and the 
decisions that affect how it works much more visible.118 The effectiveness of NGOs 
as monitoring watchdogs of the CDM is less a function of the number of NGOs 
operating in this specialised arena or the difficulties of deciphering the technicalities 
of CDM decision-making, but more the function of the receptiveness of the CDM 
Executive Board to external influence. While reforms of the CDM to foster greater 
transparency and accountability are on the agenda, the current state of international 
climate treaty negotiations has prevented much progress on this front.119 It is fair to 
say that the Commission is more receptive to NGO involvement in biofuels policy 
than the CDM Executive Board is to NGO involvement. In involving NGOs in the 
implementation of its sustainability regulatory regime, the Commission thereby 
enjoys greater monitoring capacity though this should not be overstated as 
environmental NGOs have limited human resources. 
 
The Commission has more experience than the CDM Executive Board in 
environmental regulation, broadly speaking, and a more clearly defined role as a 
regulator.120 The original intention behind the CDM was to make a concession and 
create a role for developing countries to play in a market-based mechanism that could 
theoretically deliver some sustainable development benefits. The scale of its 
development and the consequent development of a market was unexpected. The CDM 
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Executive Board was therefore not prepared to play a regulatory role and did not see 
itself as a market regulator – no effort was made to develop a working relationship 
with the DOEs, which led to a high level of mistrust, and the casual use of suspension 
to discipline the DOEs has only bred sentiments of injustice and loss of the 
stigmatizing influence that gives suspension its effectiveness as an enforcement 
tool.121  
 
Finally, it should be recalled that it is central to the concept of delegation that the 
principal can withdraw the grant of authority anytime. The Commission has the power 
to withdraw its recognition of a certification scheme whenever it is of the view that 
the scheme is no longer eligible though as the above discussion shows, this power 
should be used sparingly and as a matter of last resort. Certification schemes are also 
recognised only for a maximum period of five years, which gives the Commission the 
opportunity to review the eligibility of the certification schemes.  
 
Part III: Conclusion 
 
The use of biofuels and the emergence of a global biofuels market as domestic 
demand exceed production in jurisdictions such as the EU and the US will continue to 
raise important questions - questions about science and technology, the environment, 
North-South relations, global trade, and governance. This article has narrowly focused 
on the attempt by the EU to promote ‘fair fuels’ through the creation of a regulatory 
regime governing the sustainability of biofuels produced both within the EU and 
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elsewhere. The sustainability regulatory regime was discussed in the language of 
meta-regulation and delegation theory provided a theoretical framework for analysing 
the potential for rent-seeking behaviour by the quasi-regulators, that is, the 
certification schemes. Following a comparative analysis of the role of DOEs in the 
CDM and the certification schemes in the EU sustainability scheme, the conclusion 
was drawn that the latter were more unlikely to behave in rent-seeking ways than the 
former because of the need to maintain legitimacy and the enforcement role of the 
Commission. 
 
 The environmental regulation of biofuels is also an example of the EU using 
market access to drive improvements in global environmental governance through 
raising the environmental standards in their trading partners. Any attempt by a 
powerful developed country or regional bloc to use trade-related measures to advance 
environmental objectives always raises the difficult issues of economic protectionism 
and ‘eco-imperialism’. These important issues which bear great impact on global 
trade, the environment, and the livelihoods of millions who depend on agriculture for 
their survival, will have to be left for another day.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
